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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
WESTERN DIVISION 
NO. 5:10-CV-08-BR
PAUL H. FELDMAN
and
MARTIN L. PERRY,
v.
Plaintiffs,
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSOCIATES 
CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter is before the court on the 23 January 2013 motion for summary judgment 
filed by defendants Law Enforcement Associates Corporation (“LEA”), Anthony Rand 
(“Rand”), James J. Lindsay (“Lindsay”), Joseph A. Jordan (“Jordan”) and Paul Briggs 
(“Briggs”).1 (DE # 92.) Also before the court is the 11 February 2013 motion filed by plaintiffs 
Paul H. Feldman (“Feldman”) and Martin L. Perry (“Perry”)2 to continue the trial and plaintiffs’ 
13 February 2013 motion for leave to file a separate statement of material facts in conjunction 
with their opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (DE ## 95, 97.) The 
motions are ripe for disposition.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case was previously before the court on defendants’ motion to dismiss. (DE # 37.) 
On 10 March 2011, the motion was granted in part and denied in part. (DE # 57.) See Feldman
1 For the sake of convenience, LEA, Rand, Lindsay, Jordan, and Briggs may also be referred to jointly as 
“defendants.”
2For the sake of convenience, Feldman and Perry may also be referred to jointly as “plaintiffs.”
v. Law Enforcement Assocs. Corp., 779 F. Supp. 2d 472 (E.D.N.C. 2011). Although the 10
March 2011 order set forth the relevant factual allegations that were before the court at the time 
of the decision, subsequent discovery has revealed facts that differ in varying degrees from those 
alleged in the amended complaint. The court also notes that the parties sharply dispute a large 
number of facts at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings. Instead of cataloging and 
discussing each of these disputes, the court will focus on the facts that are germane to the 
resolution of the issues presented. Because the court’s findings make many of the contested 
areas of fact irrelevant, numerous facts submitted by the parties are omitted. Additional relevant 
facts will be set forth as appropriate in the discussion section of this opinion.
LEA is a manufacturer of security and surveillance equipment used by local, state, 
federal, and international law enforcement agencies and by public and private companies. (Am. 
Compl., DE # 34, 4, 22; M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 14:7-20; J. Lindsay Dep., DE # 99-7, at
15:10-14; J. Jordan Dep., DE # 99-17, at 31:17-32:2.) The company was founded by John 
Carrington (“Carrington”), who also owned Sirchie Fingerprint Laboratories, Inc. (“Sirchie”).
(P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 13:12-18; 17:4-7.) Carrington appointed Feldman to become 
President of LEA at some time prior to 2001, and Feldman remained the company’s President 
and CEO through 27 August 2009. (Id. at 23:16-28:7.)
Perry was initially a sales contractor who conducted business with LEA. (M. Perry Dep., 
DE # 99-2, at 15:1-17:7; P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 28:8-19.) In 2006, Feldman hired Perry 
to be LEA’s Vice President of Sales and Marketing. (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 21:5-24.) 
Perry was the second highest ranking employee at LEA and reported directly to Feldman. (Id. at 
22:10-13; 27:18-21; P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 42:14-16.)
2
In 2005, Carrington pled guilty to export violations involving Sirchie. (M. White Dep., 
DE # 92-8, Ex. 19.) As a result, he was subjected to an Export Denial Order, which precluded 
him from engaging in certain export activities for five years. (Id.) In relation to these legal 
issues, Carrington resigned from LEA’s Board of Directors (“Board”) in April 2005, and he has 
not been a Board member, officer, or employee of LEA since that time. (P. Feldman Dep., DE # 
99-4, at 39:25-40:25; J. Lindsay Dep., DE # 99-7, at 14:5-10.) Carrington did continue to hold a 
significant amount of LEA stock. (P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 26:7-13.)
During the time period relevant to this lawsuit, LEA’s Board consisted of five members: 
Feldman, Perry, Rand, Lindsay, and Jordan. (A. Rand Aff., DE # 92-15, ^ 2; J. Jordan Aff., DE 
# 92-16, ^ 2; J. Lindsay Aff., DE # 92-17, ^ 2; A. Rand Suppl. Aff., DE # 92-19, ^ 2; M. Perry 
Dep., DE # 99-2, at 29:6-30:21 & Ex. 38, DE # 92-3, at 222;3 P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 
39:5-6; 44:10-25; M. Finkelstein Dep., DE # 99-9, at 17:4-7.) Feldman and Perry will be 
referred to as the “Inside Directors” because they were both directors and employees of LEA. 
Rand, Lindsay, and Jordan will be referred to as the “Outside Directors” because they were 
never employees of the company.
An “extraordinarily palpable” split existed between the Inside Directors and the Outside 
Directors since at least 1 November 2007. (M. Finkelstein Dep., DE # 99-9, at 20:18; see also 
id. at 22:2-7; 42:7-11; 69:14-19; P. Briggs Aff., DE # 92-7, ^ 5; Pls.’ Statement Material Facts, 
DE # 99-1, at 2 ^ B; P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, at 262:16-263:2; E. Littman Dep., DE # 99-15,
3
The court notes that it has utilized plaintiffs’ filings as much as possible when citing to deposition 
testimony because plaintiffs have submitted the witnesses’ deposition transcripts in their entirety. However, when 
citing to certain exhibits that accompany the deposition testimony, it has been necessary for the court to refer to 
defendants’ submissions. In these instances, the page citations to the deposition exhibits are to those generated by 
CM/ECF.
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at 39:20-40:12; Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 19, DE # 99-20.) The exact reason for the 
split is hotly disputed, but it is apparent from the record that it was related to the announcement 
of Carrington’s sale of LEA stock to Raymond James. The Outside Directors contend that this 
event damaged the relationship between them and the Inside Directors because Feldman was 
angry about the sale. Carrington had previously told Feldman that he did not intend to sell LEA 
and that he would give Feldman a chance to purchase his stock if he ever did try to sell the 
company. (P. Briggs Aff., DE # 92-7, ^ 3; P. Briggs Aff., DE # 92-13, ^  14-15; S. Carrington 
Aff., DE # 92-14, ^ 3; P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 180:6-181:25; M. White Dep., DE # 99-6, 
at 43:20-44:21; E. Littman Dep., DE # 99-15, at 156:21-157:15.) In contrast, plaintiffs maintain 
that the proposed sale soured relations not because Feldman was angry about the sale, but 
because the Outside Directors, who had personal relationships with Carrington, became 
consumed with protecting Carrington and with ensuring that the sale of the company would go 
through. (Pls.’ Statement Material Facts, DE # 99-1, at 22-25 § III.A.; P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99­
5, at 265:14-266:1; E. Littman Dep., DE # 99-15, at 38:7-39:12; 53:4-54:18; 71:19-74:4.)
In or around December 2007, plaintiffs confirmed that Carrington owned fifty percent of 
a company called SAFE Source. (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 243:9-12; 245:14-247:11; P. 
Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 178:8-180:5; P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, at 184:16-185:1.) In 2005 
or 2006, LEA had shipped some of its products to SAFE Source, and SAFE Source then 
exported the products to Chile. (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 247:8-11; P. Feldman Dep., DE # 
99-4, at 176:13-16; P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, at 169:10-170:12; 174:10-18.) Because 
Carrington had been banned from making exports for five years and because he had an 
ownership interest in SAFE Source, plaintiffs maintain that it was illegal for SAFE Source to
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engage in the export business. (Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 44, DE # 99-45.)
A meeting of LEA’s Board was conducted on 27 December 2007. There is a sharp 
dispute about what was said and by whom at the meeting, and competing versions of the meeting 
minutes were subsequently circulated. (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., DE # 92-1, at 4-5;
M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 249:16-250:6 & Ex. 38, DE # 92-3, at 221, 227-28; P. Feldman 
Dep., DE # 99-4, at 188:13-24.) At this meeting, plaintiffs contend that Feldman notified the 
Board that there were possible export violations relating to Carrington and SAFE Source and that 
these violations needed to be reported to the proper governmental agencies. (M. Perry Dep., DE 
# 99-2, at 324:3-325:20; P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 188:13-191:12.) Plaintiffs believed that 
LEA’s involvement with SAFE Source caused LEA to engage in illegal exports and that this 
involvement with SAFE Source also constituted violations of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s rules governing internal accounting controls. (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 
324:3-325:1.) On 14 January 2008, plaintiffs sent a letter to Phil Kuhn, an agent with the Bureau 
of Industry and Security, which is a division of the Department of Commerce, regarding 
Carrington’s ownership of SAFE Source and the illegal export business that SAFE Source 
conducted with LEA. (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 222:3-6; 228:9-21; 264:13-265:1; P. 
Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 166:7-167:2; Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 44, DE # 99­
45.)
In February or March 2008, Feldman relocated LEA’s headquarters from Youngsville, 
North Carolina to Raleigh, North Carolina. (A. Rand Aff., DE # 92-15, ^ 10; P. Feldman Dep., 
DE # 99-4, at 198:23-202:10 & Ex. 63, DE # 92-4, at 113; P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, at 124:20­
22.) The Outside Directors were concerned about possibly being obligated under the old and
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new leases, and they viewed Feldman’s actions as insubordination because he had been 
instructed not to go forward with the new lease until the Outside Directors could review the 
matter. (M. Perry Dep., Ex. 38, DE # 92-3, at 225-26; P. Feldman Dep., Ex. 63, DE # 92-4, at 
113; A. Rand Aff., DE # 92-15, U 10; J. Jordan Aff., DE # 92-16, U 4; J. Lindsay Aff., DE # 92­
17, U 7; A. Rand Dep., DE # 99-3, at 203:9-204:6, 262:22-263:6; 264:7-11; P. Briggs Dep., DE # 
99-5, at 141:2-142:11; J. Lindsay Dep., DE # 99-7, at 57:10-60:2; M. Finkelstein Dep., DE # 99­
9, at 36:22-37:2; 141:12-20; 148:3-11; E. Littman Dep., DE # 99-15, at 70:19-71:14.) Feldman 
claims that he moved LEA to a new location because it benefitted the company in numerous 
ways. (Pls.’ Statement Material Facts, DE # 99-1, at 35-39 § III.G.; P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, 
at 123:10-124:19; 127:3-140:19.)
In 2009, Feldman and other LEA representatives met with LEA shareholders Joseph and 
Barbara Wortley (the “Wortleys”), who were threatening to sue LEA. (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99­
2, at 39:2-14; P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 65:19-66:3; P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, at 
154:11-155:1; E. Littman Dep., DE # 99-15, at 92:8-93:13.) Joseph Wortley “voiced his 
dissatisfaction with the board of directors . . . .” (E. Littman Dep., DE # 99-15, at 94:12-13.) In 
response, Feldman stated that the Board “could do more to help the company” and that “he too 
wished they would do more.” (Id. at 95:11-12, 17; see also id., Ex. 26, DE # 92-12, at 256:21­
258:10; P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, at 155:14-157:19.) After meeting with the Wortleys, 
Feldman wrote to the Outside Directors and urged them to resign from the Board. (E. Littman 
Dep., Ex. 26, DE # 92-12, at 253:25-254:20; J. Jordan Dep., DE # 99-17, at 35:14-36:3.)
On 26 August 2009, Rand asked Perry to meet him for lunch. (A. Rand Aff., DE # 92­
15, U 14; M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 33:6-34:8.) Perry told Feldman about the invitation, and
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they decided to surreptitiously tape the meeting. Perry wore a hidden recorder to the lunch. (M.
Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 34:14-36:12; P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 59:15-61:23; 63:10-17.) 
At the lunch, Rand informed Perry in confidence that the Outside Directors planned to terminate 
Feldman during the Board meeting scheduled for the following day because the Board had lost 
confidence in him and because of the “Wortley situation.” (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 38:1, 
25; see also id. at 37:2-39:1; 39:25-40:5 & Ex. 4, DE # 92-3, at 18:2-22; 20:13-22:4; A. Rand 
Aff., DE # 92-15, ^  11, 14; J. Jordan Aff., DE # 92-16, ^ 5; J. Lindsay Aff., DE # 92-17, m  7-8; 
A. Rand Dep., DE # 99-3, at 262:12-21 & Ex. 33, DE # 92-10, at 70; J. Lindsay Dep., DE # 99­
7, at 66:13-20; J. Jordan Dep., DE # 99-17, at 35:14-36:3; 53:15-54:11.) Rand also told Perry 
that Alan Terry would be named Interim President of LEA and that the Outside Directors wanted 
Perry to stay employed. (A. Rand Aff., DE # 92-15, ^  13-14; M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 
38:11-12; 39:15-20 & Ex. 4, DE # 92-3, at 18:9-18; 25:17-18; 26:3-4; 40:9-20; 54:21-55:6.) 
Immediately thereafter, Perry told Feldman what Rand said during the lunch. (M. Perry Dep., 
DE # 99-2, at 43:6-45:2; P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 65:7-18.)
After learning of his impending termination, Feldman went to the hospital during the 
evening of 26 August 2009, claiming that he was possibly having a transient ischemic attack. (P. 
Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 132:8-135:20 & Ex. 49, DE # 92-4, at 87.) Feldman did not attend 
the 27 August 2009 Board meeting, and his employment was terminated during that meeting.
(A. Rand Aff., DE # 92-15, 13, 19; J. Jordan Aff., DE # 92-16, H 8; M. Perry Dep., Ex. 7, DE
# 92-3, at 125; P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 77:6-11; 78:23-80:10.)
Perry, who had a history of multiple sclerosis, was also unable to attend the 27 August 
2009 Board meeting because he was taken to the hospital that day. (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2,
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at 57:1-60:10; 154:1-156:5 & Ex. 30, DE # 92-3, at 192-99.) He was diagnosed as having 
suffered an acute multiple sclerosis flare. (Id., Ex. 30, DE # 92-3, at 198.) Perry did not return 
to work after 27 August 2009. (Id., DE # 99-2, at 66:1-4.) On 14 September 2009, Alan Terry 
(“Terry”), LEA’s new President, sent Perry a letter stating that Perry had failed to respond to 
communications from LEA. (Id., Ex. 14, DE # 92-3, at 132.) Terry also demanded an 
immediate response from Perry regarding his intentions about returning to work. (Id.) When 
LEA did not receive a response to the 14 September 2009 letter, Briggs, LEA’s Chief Financial 
Officer, sent a letter to Perry on 23 September 2009. (Id., Ex. 15, DE # 92-3, at 133.) Briggs 
stated that LEA had no choice but to conclude that Perry had “abandoned” his job. (Id.) LEA 
considered Perry to have voluntarily quit as of the date of the letter. (Id.)
Although plaintiffs initially filed separate complaints, they subsequently filed a 
consolidated complaint in this matter on 16 April 2010. (DE # 31.) Plaintiffs filed an amended 
complaint on 7 June 2010. (DE # 34.) Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on 21 June 2010, 
which was granted in part and denied in part on 10 March 2011. (DE ## 37, 57.) The claims 
remaining in this case are (1) both plaintiffs’ claims against LEA under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act; (2) both plaintiffs’ whistleblower claims against all defendants under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to the extent that they rely on actions taken by Feldman prior to 27 
August 2009 or actions taken by Perry prior to 23 September 2009; (3) Perry’s claim against 
LEA under the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act; and (4) Perry’s breach of contract claim 
against LEA. See Feldman, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 502. Also remaining before the court is LEA’s 
counterclaim against plaintiffs for breach of fiduciary duty. (Defs.’ Answer, DE # 36, at 44-57.)
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Separate Statement of Material Facts in Dispute 
As an initial matter, the court considers plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a separate
statement of material facts in dispute in conjunction with their opposition to defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment. (DE # 97.) Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ opposition, taken as a 
whole, violates Local Civil Rule 7.2(e), which requires a memorandum filed in opposition to a 
motion to be thirty pages or less, excluding the certificate of service page. In this case, while the 
body of plaintiffs’ memorandum is thirty pages long (DE # 99), the memorandum also includes a 
separate fifty-two page statement of material facts in dispute that is attached as an appendix (DE 
# 99-1). This district’s Local Rules do not explicitly permit a separate submission of a statement 
of facts, and the court agrees with defendants that the document is an attempt to avoid the page 
limits set by Local Civil Rule 7.2(e). Nevertheless, the court will not disregard the separate 
statement of facts, and plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file the statement will be granted. Cf. 
Trustees of Nev. Resort Ass’n v. Grasswood Partners, Inc., No. 2-11-cv-00044-MMD-NJK,
2013 WL 1249617, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 27, 2013).
B. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 
1. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper only if the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a). Summary judgment should be granted only in those cases “in which it is perfectly clear 
that no genuine issue of material fact remains unresolved and inquiry into the facts is 
unnecessary to clarify the application of the law.” Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun,
9
Inc., 6 F.3d 211, 214 (4th Cir. 1993). “[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are
material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 
law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant 
of summary judgment. Id.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party and to view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 255. The moving party has the burden to show an 
absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 325 (1986). The party opposing summary judgment must then demonstrate that a triable 
issue of fact exists; he may not rest upon mere allegations or denials. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 
A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the case is insufficient. Id. at 252. Furthermore, 
evidence that is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative” will not suffice to defeat a 
motion for summary judgment. Id. at 249. Rather, if the adverse party fails to bring forth facts 
showing that “reasonable minds could differ” on a material point, then disposition by summary 
judgment is appropriate. Id. at 250; see also Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 v. Centra, Inc., 947 
F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir. 1991).
As mentioned previously, defendants’ 21 June 2010 motion to dismiss was granted in 
part and denied in part. See Feldman, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 502. A motion to dismiss, granted or 
denied, may have an effect on a subsequent motion for summary judgment. However, “[i]n 
general, ‘the ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief is addressed 
solely to the sufficiency of the complaint and does not prevent summary judgment from
10
subsequently being granted based on material outside the complaint.’” PDK Labs Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 
Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 3D § 2713 at 233 (2d ed. 1998)); 
see also Wilderness Soc’y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“In sum, while a motion to 
dismiss may be decided on the pleadings alone, construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff, a 
motion for summary judgment by definition entails an opportunity for a supplementation of the 
record, and accordingly a greater showing is demanded of the plaintiff.”).
2. Perry’s North Carolina Wage and Hour Act Claim/Breach of Contract Claim
In this case, Perry’s breach of contract claim against LEA is brought in the alternative to 
his claim under the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act. (Am. Compl., DE # 34, ^  333-338.) 
See Feldman, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 502. These claims are based on Feldman’s oral promise to 
Perry of a bonus of $50,000 if LEA secured a large contract with the Census Bureau. (M. Perry 
Dep., DE # 99-2, at 291:21-296:11; P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 225:18-230:22.) Although 
the Census Bureau contract was completed by June 2009, Feldman never paid the bonus to 
Perry. (Id.; P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, at 22:19-23:13; 34:2-35:10; A. Rand Dep., DE # 99-44, 
at 349:1-15; 351:3-15.)
The court finds that Perry has conceded that summary judgment is appropriate on both 
the wage claim and the contract claim because he has failed to respond to the arguments raised 
with respect to these claims in defendants’ memorandum in support of the motion for summary 
judgment. See, e.g., Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Watson Pharms., Inc., Nos. 
2:07-CV-01472-KJD-GWF, 2:08-CV-00995-KJD-GWF, 2012 WL 1079574, at *7 (D. Nev. Mar. 
30, 2012) (failure to oppose movant’s argument in brief opposing motion for summary judgment
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implicitly concedes the argument (citing S. Nev. Shell Dealers Ass’n v. Shell Oil Co., 725 F.
Supp. 1104, 1109 (D. Nev. 1989)); Ferdinand-Davenport v. Children’s Guild, 742 F. Supp. 2d 
772, 777 (D. Md. 2010) (plaintiff abandoned claim by failing to respond to defendant’s 
argument); Klugel v. Small, 519 F. Supp. 2d 66, 72 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[W]hen a party does not 
address arguments raised by a movant, the court may treat those arguments as conceded.”).
Even if Perry had not made such a concession, the wage claim and the contract claim 
would still fail. After Feldman’s termination, LEA filed for bankruptcy. (A. Rand Dep., DE # 
99-23, at 6:5-7:8.) On 12 July 2012, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District 
of North Carolina ruled that “Feldman and Perry may continue to pursue their claims against 
LEA, to the extent that insurance coverage exists, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of North Carolina. . . . Feldman and Perry will make no claims against the bankruptcy 
estate or the Chapter 7 trustee; and their recovery against LEA, if any, will be limited to the 
proceeds of any applicable insurance.” (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. S, DE # 92-21, at 1.) LEA 
has insurance coverage under an Employment Practices Liability Insurance policy issued by 
Zurich American Insurance Company. (Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 41, DE # 99-42.) 
The policy explicitly excludes coverage for contract claims and wage claims. (Id., Exclusions G. 
& H., at DEF-000418-19.) Accordingly, even if the court assumes arguendo that LEA owes 
Perry the $50,000 bonus, there can be no recovery as a result of the bankruptcy court’s order.
See, e.g., Neighbors Law Firm, P.C. v. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P., No. 5:09-CV-352-F, 2010 
WL 5477260, at *3-4 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 28, 2010). Thus, summary judgment on these claims is 
warranted.
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3. Americans with Disabilities Act Claims
Both Feldman and Perry assert claims against LEA for wrongful discharge and for failure 
to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. 
The ADA prohibits discrimination “against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in 
regard to . . . terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). It must 
be noted that Congress made substantial changes to the ADA through the ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), which has an effective date of 1 January 2009. Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 
8, 122 Stat. 3553, 3559 (2008). The ADAAA was intended to clarify congressional intent with 
respect to the original ADA, as well as to overturn certain United States Supreme Court cases 
that had narrowed the ADA’s scope. Id., § 2(b), 122 Stat. at 3554. Under the ADAAA, “[t]he 
definition of disability . . . shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals . . . , to 
the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A). “The 
primary purpose of the ADAAA is to make it easier for people with disabilities to obtain 
protection under the ADA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4). As determined previously, the ADAAA 
applies to plaintiffs’ claims. See Feldman, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 483. Therefore, the court has 
considered plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to this new standard. 
a. Wrongful Discharge Claims
When only indirect or circumstantial evidence is available, a plaintiff alleging a violation 
of the ADA must meet the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U S. 792 (1973). See Wilson v. Phoenix Specialty Mfg. Co., Inc., 513 F.3d 378, 387 (4th 
Cir. 2008); Ennis v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1995). 
Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish aprimafacie case of discrimination. To
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establish aprimafacie case of discriminatory discharge under the ADA, a plaintiff must show: 
that “(1) he is within the ADA’s protected class; (2) he was discharged; (3) at the time of his 
discharge, he was performing the job at a level that met his employer’s legitimate expectations; 
and (4) his discharge occurred under circumstances that raise a reasonable inference of unlawful 
discrimination.” Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 252 F.3d 696, 702 (4th Cir. 2001); see 
also Reynolds v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 701 F.3d 143, 150 (4th Cir. 2012); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 
F.3d 373, 387 n.11 (4th Cir. 2001).
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the 
defendant “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse employment 
action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Should the defendant carry this burden, the 
plaintiff then must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered 
by the defendant were a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 
530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). The ultimate burden of proving that “the defendant intentionally 
discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. 
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
(1) Feldman
The first element of Feldman’s wrongful discharge claim requires a showing that he was 
“disabled” within the meaning of the ADA. Reynolds, 701 F.3d at 150; Rhoads, 257 F.3d at 
387; Lochridge v. City of Winston-Salem, 388 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625 (M.D.N.C. 2005). “The 
question of whether a plaintiff is disabled under the ADA, ‘and therefore can bring a claim under 
the statute, is a question of law for the court, not a question of fact for the jury.’” Rose v. Home 
Depot USA, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 595, 608 (D. Md. 2002) (quoting Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera,
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249 F.3d 259, 268 (4th Cir. 2001) (Rehabilitation Act case)). The ADA defines “disability” with 
respect to an individual as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being 
regarded as having such an impairment . . . . ” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). There is no dispute that 
Feldman is proceeding under the first prong of the disability definition.
On 26 August 2009, after learning of his impending termination, Feldman went to the 
hospital claiming that he was possibly having a transient ischemic attack (“TIA”), which is also 
known as a “mini-stroke.” (P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 74:1-4; 75:17-21; 132:8-135:20 & 
Ex. 49, DE # 92-4, at 87.) He was admitted overnight for observation and testing. His 
diagnostic tests were all normal, and he was discharged the following day with no restrictions. 
(Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. P, DE # 92-18; P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 136:12-17; 
141:18-145:25 & Exs. 49-50, DE # 92-4, at 85-91.) Medical records from his 1 September 2009 
follow-up visit with his primary care physician reflect that he may have had a “mild TIA” that 
had “since resolved.” (P. Feldman Dep., Ex. 54, DE # 92-4, at 92.) At that appointment, no 
restrictions were placed on Feldman, and he continued on his prior medications. (Id. at 93.) He 
did not see his doctor again until 23 November 2009, and that visit was for stress related to a 
deposition. (Id. at 96.)
Feldman’s only argument with respect to this issue is that his TIA was a disability by 
virtue of the fact that “[a]n impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would 
substantially limit a major life activity when active.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D). However, a TIA 
is an acute condition that is different from the more chronic conditions -  such as cancer, 
epilepsy, multiple sclerosis, asthma, major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia,
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hypertension, diabetes, and post-traumatic stress disorder -  that Congress intended to include 
within the definition of a disability through the enactment of this provision. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 
1630, App’x § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii); Mayo Clinic Staff, Definition of transient ischemic attack 
(TIA), The Mayo Clinic, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/transient-ischemic-attack/DS00220 
(last visited June 27, 2013) (“A transient ischemic attack (TIA) is like a stroke, producing similar 
symptoms, but usually lasting only a few minutes and causing no permanent damage. Often 
called a mini stroke, a transient ischemic attack may be a warning. About 1 in 3 people who 
have a transient ischemic attack eventually has a stroke, with about half occurring within a year 
after the transient ischemic attack.”); cf. Butler v. BTC Foods Inc., Civ. A. No. 12-492, 2012 WL 
5315034, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2012) (finding on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss that 42 
U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D) did not apply to plaintiff’s case where he failed to allege that his hernia 
was “anything more than a one-time occurrence”).
Furthermore, even if a TIA is an impairment that is episodic or in remission, and 
assuming that Feldman did in fact experience a TIA on 26 August 2009, the recognition of a 
plaintiff’s impairment is only a threshold issue in determining whether or not he has a disability 
under the ADA. Feldman must also show that his TIA “substantially limit[ed] a major life 
activity when active.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (“disability” 
defined with respect to an individual as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
one or more major life activities of such individual”). “[M]ajor life activities include, but are not 
limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, 
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, 
thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
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In determining whether Feldman was substantially limited in performing one or more
major life activities, the court is mindful that “[t]he ADAAA seeks to broaden the scope of 
disabilities covered by the ADA after that scope had been narrowed by Supreme Court 
interpretation.” Kravits v. Shinseki, Civ. A. No. 10-861, 2012 WL 604169, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 
24, 2012); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (instructing that the “[t]he definition of disability . .
. shall be construed in favor of broad coverage”). Reflecting this purpose, the accompanying 
regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission provide that “[t]he term 
‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum 
extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. ‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding 
standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). Nevertheless, “[w]hile Congress undoubtedly intended 
to broaden the scope of the ADA . . . , it remains the case that ‘not every impairment will 
constitute a disability . . . .’” Brandon v. O’Mara, No. 10 Civ. 5174(RJH), 2011 WL 4478492, at 
*7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)).
Here, Feldman has not offered any evidence beyond his overnight visit to the hospital to 
show that the TIA substantially impaired the major life activity of working4 or any other major 
life activity. (See Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Mot. Summ. J., DE # 99, at 17; Pls.’ Statement Material 
Facts, DE # 99-1, at 43 § IV.A.) Feldman has not submitted an affidavit, nor did he testify 
during his deposition regarding how, if at all, the TIA limited his ability to perform any 
activities. The evidence in this case demonstrates that all of his diagnostic testing at the hospital 
was normal, that he was discharged from the hospital on 27 August 2009 with no restrictions, 
and that his primary care physician did not subject him to any restrictions following his 1 4
4 In the amended complaint, working is the only major life activity that Feldman specifically claims to have 
been substantially limited in performing. (Am. Compl., DE # 34, ^  133, 220.)
17
September 2009 visit. Thus, even when viewing the facts relevant to Feldman’s alleged TIA in 
the light most favorable to him, and assessing those facts under the more lenient analysis called 
for by the ADAAA, there is simply no evidence in the record which shows that the TIA 
substantially limited him in any major life activity. As a result, Feldman was not disabled when 
he was discharged from his position on 27 August 2009.
Moreover, even if the court were to assume that Feldman’s scant evidence created a 
genuine dispute of material fact regarding the issue of whether he was disabled under the ADA, 
he must also show that his discharge occurred under circumstances that raise a reasonable 
inference of unlawful discrimination. To establish the fourthprima facie element of a wrongful 
discharge claim under the ADA, Feldman must present some “affirmative evidence that 
disability was a determining factor in the employer’s decision.” Ennis, 53 F.3d at 59. This 
burden is “not empty or perfunctory.” Id. Furthermore, because liability under the ADA 
requires the employer to have discriminated because of the employee’s disability, it follows that 
the employee must show that the employer knew of his alleged disability at the time it took the 
adverse employment action. That is, “an employee cannot be fired ‘because of a disability 
unless the decisionmaker has actual knowledge of the disability.” Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 
F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original); see also Huppenbauer v. May Dep’t 
Stores Co., 99 F.3d 1130 (Table), No. 95-1032, 1996 WL 607087, at *7 (4th Cir. Oct. 23, 1996) 
(unpublished) (“At the most basic level, it is intuitively clear when viewing the ADA’s language 
in a straightforward manner that an employer cannot fire an employee ‘because o f a disability 
unless it knows of the disability. If it does not know of the disability, the employer is firing the 
employee ‘because o f some other reason.” (quoting Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 47 F.3d
18
928, 932 (7th Cir. 1995))); Trammell v. Raytheon Missile Svs.. 721 F. Supp. 2d 876, 878 (D.
Ariz. 2010).
In this case. Feldman fails to point to any evidence which shows that his employer knew 
that he had been hospitalized when he was terminated during the 27 August 2009 Board meeting. 
Rather. the evidence demonstrates that neither Feldman nor Perry notified the Outside Directors 
about Feldman’s condition. (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 56:9-12; P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, 
at 77:2-5; A. Rand Suppl. Aff., DE # 92-19, ^  2-4.) In addition, Feldman’s absence from the 
Board meeting was expected because he had previously indicated that he would not be present. 
(P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 45:7-48:2 & Ex. 45, DE # 92-4, at 84; A. Rand Suppl. Aff., DE 
# 92-19, ^ 4.)
Furthermore, although Feldman’s personal attorney, Joseph Jorgensen (“Jorgensen”),5 
appeared at the Board meeting after it was already underway, the record evidence shows only 
that Jorgensen “asked that the meeting be postponed.” (A. Rand Suppl. Aff., DE # 92-19, ^ 5.) 
There is no evidence to establish that Jorgensen told the Outside Directors that Feldman had 
been hospitalized or that he had suffered a TIA.6 There is also no evidence to show that 
Jorgensen specifically asked for an accommodation for Feldman for a reason related to a medical 
condition.7 Thus, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that LEA knew about Feldman’s 567
5 Jorgensen had worked as an attorney for LEA prior to his personal representation of Feldman. (M. Perry 
Dep., DE # 99-2, at 244:23-245:2; P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 67:1-68:16; E. Littman Dep., DE # 99-15, at 
19:10-13.)
6 The court finds it particularly telling that Jorgensen has failed to submit an affidavit detailing what he said 
at the 27 August 2009 Board meeting.
7 In plaintiffs’ Statement of Material Facts in Dispute, Feldman claims that “Jorgensen requested that LEA 
reasonably accommodate Feldman’s disability by rescheduling the meeting until Feldman was able to attend.” (Pls.’ 
Statement Material Facts, DE # 99-1, at 44 § IV.B. ^ 3.) To support this “fact,” Feldman cites only to the allegations
(continued...)
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condition when he was terminated on 27 August 2009.
Moreover, it is clear from the evidentiary record that the decision to terminate Feldman 
was made either prior to or at the same time that Feldman began to experience symptoms of a 
TIA.7 8 (See, eg., A. Rand Aff., DE # 92-15, ^  10-14, 19; P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 74:13­
75:5; J. Lindsay Dep., DE # 99-7, at 64:18-66:22; J. Jordan Dep., DE # 99-17, at 34:7-36:19.) 
Feldman’s experience of a physical impairment is a necessary antecedent to his showing that he 
was terminated because of a disability. Because Feldman can only show at best that his TIA 
symptoms and the termination decision occurred contemporaneously, he cannot prove that 
discrimination was the motive for the adverse employment decision. As a result, Feldman fails 
to establish the fourth element of his wrongful discharge claim.
Assuming for the sake of argument that Feldman could establish aprima facie case of
7(...continued)
in plaintiffs’ amended complaint and to defendants’ memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment. 
(Id.) Feldman may not rely on the allegations in plaintiffs’ pleadings to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
See, e.g., Cheesewright v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 2:11-cv-15631, 2013 WL 639135, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 21, 
2013); Walton v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, No. 1:11-cv-00417-JMS-MJD, 2012 WL 6596879, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Dec.
18, 2012) (“Citing to allegations in a complaint does not comply with Rule 56.”).
Furthermore, defendants’ summary judgment memorandum states that “ [t]he only ‘accommodation’ 
allegedly requested related to Feldman was Jorgensen’s request to postpone the Board meeting after it was already 
underway.” (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., DE # 92-1, at 22 (emphasis added).) It is evident from this 
language that LEA was not agreeing with Feldman’s position but was merely detailing his argument with respect to 
the accommodation issue. As a result, Feldman has failed to demonstrate that Jorgensen requested a reasonable 
accommodation on his behalf.
8
It appears likely from the record that the decision to fire Feldman was made prior to his experiencing any 
symptoms of a TIA. Jordan spoke with Rand about Feldman’s termination about a week before it occurred, and 
Jordan made arrangements to attend the 27 August 2009 Board meeting in person. (J. Jordan Dep., DE # 99-17, at 
34:7-15.) In preparation for Feldman’s termination, Rand also arranged to have Terry serve as Interim President of 
LEA. (A. Rand Aff., DE # 92-15, H 12.)
However, Lindsay could not recall exactly when he discussed Feldman’s termination with Rand. He 
testified that the discussion could have occurred on the morning of 26 August 2009. (J. Lindsay Dep., DE # 99-7, at 
65:1-3.) Similarly, Feldman could not recall exactly when he began to experience symptoms of a TIA. He testified 
that the TIA symptoms could have started either before or after Perry’s lunch with Rand on 26 August 2009. (P. 
Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 74:13-21.) Thus, when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Feldman, the 
final termination decision may have been made on the morning of 26 August 2009, which was the same time that 
Feldman could have started experiencing symptoms of a TIA. As has already been demonstrated, the Outside 
Directors did not know that Feldman experienced symptoms of a TIA while he was at work on 26 August 2009.
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discrimination within the McDonnell Douglas framework, LEA has produced evidence of
Feldman’s insubordination, which is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination. 
Cf Wilson v. UPS, Inc., Civ. A. No. 1:10-cv-636, 2012 WL 405064, at *5 (ED. Va. Feb. 7) 
(Title VII case), affd, 479 F. App’x 453 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (unpublished); Smith v. 
Martin, No. 5:10-CV-248-D, 2011 WL 3703255, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2011) (same). In 
particular, LEA has pointed to the fact that Feldman moved the company’s headquarters after 
being instructed not to do so. (See, e.g., A. Rand Aff., DE # 92-15, U 10; J. Jordan Aff., DE # 
92-16, U 4; J. Lindsay Aff., DE # 92-17, U 7; A. Rand Dep., DE # 99-3, at 262:12-264:13.) After 
a history of conflict with the Outside Directors, Feldman was also deemed to have been 
insubordinate when he made comments to the Wortleys about the Outside Directors’s lack of 
involvement in LEA’s operations and then emailed the Outside Directors and urged them to 
resign from the Board.9 (See, e.g., E. Littman Dep., Ex. 26, DE # 92-12, at 253:25-254:20; 
256:21-258:10; A. Rand Aff., DE # 92-15, U 11; J. Jordan Aff., DE # 92-16, U 5; J. Lindsay Aff., 
DE # 92-17, UU 7-8; A. Rand Dep., DE # 99-3, at 262:12-21 & Ex. 33, DE # 92-10, at 70; P. 
Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, at 155:14-157:19; J. Lindsay Dep., DE # 99-7, at 66:13-20; J. Jordan 
Dep., DE # 99-17, at 35:14-36:19; 53:15-54:11.)
Because LEA has offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Feldman’s 
termination, the burden shifts back to Feldman to raise a genuine dispute of material fact 9
9 Feldman has admitted under oath in a deposition taken in another case that he wrote the following to the 
Outside Directors:
Quite frankly, I fail to see why the three of you want to remain on the Board given that 
you have no vested interest in the company and have expressed very little interest in 
helping out our business or being involved. I really do believe that it is in the best 
interest of both LEA and the three of you to resign, but that is up to you.
(E. Littman Dep., Ex. 26, DE # 92-12, at 254:8-15.)
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concerning pretext. Although Feldman attempts to show that he was meeting or actually
exceeding LEA’s performance expectations (see, e.g., Pls.’ Statement Material Facts, DE # 99-1, 
at 33-35, 41-43 §§ III.F., III.I.), he was fired for insubordination and not just for substandard 
performance. He also attempts to demonstrate that he was not insubordinate (see, e.g., id. at 35­
41, §§ III.G.-H.), but the Fourth Circuit has repeatedly explained that “[i]t is the perception of 
the decision maker which is relevant, not the self-assessment of the plaintiff.” Evans v. Techs. 
Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 960-61 (4th Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Wilson, 2012 WL 405064, at *5 (plaintiff’s “own subjective belief that 
he should not have been terminated, or that he was not insubordinate, is irrelevant”). The court 
need not decide “whether the [proffered] reason was wise, fair, or even correct, ultimately, so 
long as it truly was the reason for the plaintiff’s termination.” Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 
F.3d 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Feldman has failed to show that his employer did not honestly believe that he was 
insubordinate,10 and there is simply no evidence in the record from which a rational fact finder 
could conclude that LEA’s decision to terminate Feldman was a pretext designed to mask 
disability discrimination. Accordingly, the court will grant the motion for summary judgment as 
to Feldman’s ADA wrongful discharge claim.
(2) Perry
With respect to Perry’s wrongful discharge claim, he too must first show that he was 
“disabled” within the meaning of the ADA. Reynolds, 701 F.3d at 150; Rhoads, 257 F.3d at
10 In fact, Feldman has admitted under oath in a deposition taken in another case that it was “the Board’s 
perce[ption]” that he “went down there [to meet with the Wortleys] and threw them[, i.e., the Outside Directors,] 
under the bus . . . .” (E. Littman Dep., Ex. 26, DE # 92-12, at 253:23-24.)
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387; Lochridge, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 625. In this case, it is undisputed that Perry is proceeding 
under the first prong of the disability definition and that he suffers from multiple sclerosis 
(“MS”). (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 154:1-156:5 & Ex. 30, DE # 92-3, at 195.) LEA has 
stated that “Perry can likely establish element 1 because the [ADAAA] seemingly finds MS to be 
a disability even when in remission.” (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., DE # 92-1, at 17-18 
n.17.) As LEA has acknowledged, the ADAAA provides that “[a]n impairment that is episodic 
or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.” 42 
U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D); see also 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App’x § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii) (listing MS as an 
example of an impairment that is episodic or in remission). Furthermore, during his deposition, 
Perry testified regarding his substantial limitations in performing one or more major life 
activities. For example, he explained that he suffered from significant fatigue and weakness, that 
he had trouble walking, and that he could not drive a car while he was suffering from his MS 
flare-up. (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 203:1-204:22.) Thus, the court finds that Perry has 
established the first element of hisprimafacie wrongful discharge claim.
LEA argues that Perry cannot establish the second element of his prima facie case 
because he was not discharged. Rather, LEA maintains that Perry abandoned his position and 
was deemed to have voluntarily quit. Although Perry contests many of the facts asserted by 
LEA regarding his separation from employment, the court finds that he does not dispute or has 
failed to sufficiently dispute the following facts:
1. Perry was the second highest ranking employee at LEA and thus had a critical 
position within the company. (Pls.’ Statement Material Facts, DE # 99-1, at 2 ^ F.)
2. LEA offered continued employment to Perry despite Feldman’s termination. (M.
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Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 39:15-20 & Ex. 4, DE # 92-3, at 18:9-10; 25:17-18; 26:3-4; 40:9-20; 
54:21-55:6.)
3. Perry neither communicated directly with LEA nor performed work for LEA after he 
was admitted to the hospital on 27 August 2009. (Pls.’ Statement Material Facts, DE # 99-1, at 3 
^ S; M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 66:1-4; 85:20-86:1; 99:17-100:15; 208:3-12.)
4. Perry’s wife communicated with Briggs on Perry’s behalf on only two occasions -  31 
August 2009 and 4 September 2009. (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 76:12-25; 85:23-24; 205:6-7; 
206:9-208:12 & Ex. 12, DE # 92-3, at 130; P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, at 278:6-279:18; 281:13­
282:20; 291:17.)
5. LEA’s employee handbook states that employees who fail to report to work or contact 
their supervisor for two consecutive work days are deemed to have abandoned their job, and 
Perry signed a document acknowledging his receipt of the handbook. (M. Perry Dep., Ex. 19,
DE # 92-3, at 147; Ex. 20, DE # 92-3, at 186.)
6. On 19 September 2009, Perry received a letter from Terry, LEA’s Interim President,
dated 14 September 2009,11 which stated in part:
You have not come to work since August 27 nor have you personally 
communicated with me. . . . If I do not hear from you immediately, I will assume 
that it is your intention not to return. Please communicate with me personally as 
soon as you receive this letter to let me know what your intentions are with regard 
to LEA.
(Id., DE # 99-2, at 86:2-88:21 & Ex. 14, DE # 92-3, at 132.)
11 Perry contends that he did not receive Terry’s letter in a timely fashion because it was left at a door of his 
residence that was not normally used by him or his family. (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 86:18-87:17; 88:17-21.)
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7. Neither Perry nor his wife responded to the 14 September 2009 letter in any way.12 
(Id., DE # 99-2, at 90:19-91:2; A. Terry Aff., DE # 102-7, UU 6, 8.)
8. LEA did not send the final separation letter concluding that Perry had abandoned his 
job until 23 September 2009, four days after Perry received the 14 September 2009 letter. (M. 
Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 91:19-92:14; 94:3-9 & Ex. 15, DE # 92-3, at 133; P. Briggs Aff., DE # 
92-7, U 23.)
These facts show that Perry abandoned his job by failing to respond to Terry’s 14 
September 2009 letter.13 It is undisputed that Perry failed to follow company policy by not 
keeping LEA informed of his status.
Perry tries to create a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to this issue by 
arguing that he did not respond to Terry’s letter because he was limited in his ability to 
communicate and because his doctor instructed him not to communicate directly with LEA.
(Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Mot. Summ. J., DE # 99, at 23; M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 100:16-102:3; 
213:12-214:5.) Even if the court accepts Perry’s arguments as to why he himself failed to 
respond to the letter, Perry fails to explain why his wife did not respond for him as she had on 31 
August 2009 and 4 September 2009. Although the 14 September 2009 letter called for a 
personal response from Perry, his wife could have informed Terry that Perry was incapable of 
communicating, that he was instructed by his doctor not to communicate with LEA, and that he
12The record demonstrates that Perry did not take the letter seriously. During his deposition, he testified 
that he thought that the letter “was kind of crazy.” (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 91:8.) He also appears to have 
discounted the seriousness of the situation because LEA did not require him to sign for the letter. (Id. at 91:8-9.)
13 The court notes that the North Carolina Employment Security Commission also concluded that Perry 
abandoned his job when it denied his claim for unemployment benefits. (M. Perry Dep., Ex. 22, DE # 92-3, at 187­
90.)
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needed more time off from work. Perry himself acknowledges that “[t]here was no policy or
practice at LEA that made it wrong for a spouse of an employee, on the employee’s behalf, to 
inform the company that the employee was sick.” (Pls.’ Statement Material Facts, DE # 99-1, at 
48 § IV.D. ^ 14; see also P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, at 295:20-296:16.) Given the history of 
communication between Perry’s wife and Briggs, no reasonable jury could conclude that the 
directive from Perry’s doctor definitively precluded him from having messages communicated to 
LEA on his behalf. LEA’s employee handbook required Perry to communicate with his 
managers (M. Perry Dep., Ex. 19, DE # 92-3, at 147), and his failure to do so resulted in his 
being deemed to have abandoned his position, just as he had been warned in the 14 September 
2009 letter.
Perry also contends that he did not abandon his position because he claims that he was on 
medical leave on 23 September 2009, the date that LEA sent the final separation letter. (See 
Pls.’ Statement Material Facts, DE # 99-1, at 46 § IV.D. (“Perry was on medical leave from 
August 27, 2009 through September 23, 2009 and he did not abandon his position[.]”).) It is not 
disputed that Perry’s wife spoke to Briggs over the telephone on 4 September 2009. (M. Perry 
Dep., DE # 99-2, at 85:23-24; 205:6-7; 206:9-208:12 & Ex. 12, DE # 92-3, at 130; P. Briggs 
Dep., DE # 99-5, at 278:6-279:18; 281:13-282:20; 291:17.) Perry maintains that his wife offered 
to provide a doctor’s note to Briggs during this call, but Briggs did not want to see it.14 (M.
Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 101:13-15; 180:9-16; 205:3-14; 205:22-206:2.) At that time, Perry 
had in his possession a note from Dr. Mitchell Freedman (“Dr. Freedman”), dated 3 September 14
14 In contrast, Briggs maintains that Perry’s wife never mentioned a doctor’s note or that Perry would be out 
of work for ten days. (P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, at 310:8-22; 311:17-312:17.) However, the court is required to 
view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Perry, the non-moving party. See Scott 
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
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2009, placing him on “medical leave” for “10 days.” (Id. at 179:21-25; 207:14-18; Defs.’ Reply 
Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 1, DE # 102-1, at 5.) It is Perry’s view that this language means ten 
business days rather than ten calendar days. (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 179:21-180:8.) 
However, even if Perry’s interpretation is correct, the note only excused him from working 
through Friday, 18 September 2009.15 It did not excuse his non-responsiveness to LEA 
thereafter.
Perry also refers to a second doctor’s note which stated that he “should be on medical 
leave for 3 more weeks from today for flare up of his multiple sclerosis.” (Defs.’ Reply Supp. 
Mot. Summ. J., Ex. B, DE # 102-2.) Although this note is surprisingly undated, Perry maintains 
that he obtained it from Dr. Freedman on 17 September 2009. (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 
96:11-97:6; 182:7-185:19; 202:10-24; see also Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 39, DE # 
99-40.) However, it is undisputed that this second doctor’s note was not offered or provided to 
LEA until after LEA had deemed Perry to have voluntarily quit his job on 23 September 2009. 
(M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 205:18-206:8 & Ex. 15, DE # 92-3, at 133; Defs.’ Reply Supp. 
Mot. Summ. J., Ex. C, DE # 102-3.) Thus, Perry’s attempt to rely on the second note from Dr. 
Freedman to show that he was on medical leave on 23 September 2009 is unpersuasive. 
Accordingly, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Perry was on medical leave on 23 
September 2009.
Perry’s reliance on the fact that Briggs did not want to see the 3 September 2009 note 
from Dr. Freedman is also unavailing. While an employer may ask an employee to furnish a
15 In calculating this date, the court did not include the day on which the note was written, i.e., 3 September 
2009, or the Labor Day holiday, which occurred on 7 September 2009.
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doctor’s note to determine whether an absence is justified, the court is unaware of any authority 
requiring the employer to do so, and Perry has not pointed to any such authority. Furthermore, 
to the extent that Perry is arguing that Briggs was agreeing to an extended or indefinite leave of 
absence by declining the proffered doctor’s note, such an inference is unreasonable based on the 
record evidence. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Perry, it 
demonstrates that his wife did not speak to Briggs in vague terms regarding the amount of time 
that he would be out of work. Rather, based on the note from Dr. Freedman, she specifically told 
Briggs that Perry would be out for “10 days” or “two weeks.” (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 
205:22-206:2; 207:14-18; Defs.’ Reply Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 1, DE # 102-1, at 5.) It is 
simply not reasonable to infer that an extended or indefinite period of medical leave was granted 
when a very specific period of leave was requested. Moreover, there is no evidentiary support 
for Perry’s contention that his wife told Briggs that he would be out for “several weeks[]” or “at 
least two to three weeks.” (Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Mot. Summ. J., DE # 99, at 2, 23.) Nor is it 
reasonable to infer that Perry was excused from communicating with LEA indefinitely based on 
the fact that Briggs did not want to see the note, particularly after Perry received the 14 
September 2009 letter from Terry.
Finally, Perry attempts to create a genuine dispute of material fact by referencing the hire 
of Jay Becker (“Becker”). Perry argues that LEA hired Becker to replace him prior to his 
separation from employment with the company, thus evidencing LEA’s intent to fire him. (Pls.’ 
Mem. Opp’n Mot. Summ. J., DE # 99, at 2, 19, 23.) However, it is undisputed that Becker was
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hired by Feldman prior to Feldman’s termination.16 (Pls.’ Statement Material Facts, DE # 99-1, 
at 50 § IV.E. ^ 1; P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, at 298:1-299:10; P. Briggs Suppl. Aff., DE # 102-4, 
^ 5.) Thus, it is not reasonable to infer that the hiring of Becker was part of a scheme by the 
Outside Directors to terminate Perry. Furthermore, both Briggs and Rand have testified that 
LEA did not intend to replace Perry with Becker when the offer to Becker was made; rather, 
Becker would have reported to Perry. (A. Rand Dep., DE # 99-3, at 314:19-315:11; P. Briggs 
Dep., DE # 99-5, at 298:1-299:20; P. Briggs Suppl. Aff., DE # 102-4, ^ 6.) In addition, although 
Terry may have said that Perry would have to travel more upon his return from leave (Pls.’ Mem. 
Opp’n Mot. Summ. J., DE # 99, at 19; P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, at 301:11-303:11), this does 
not show that LEA intended to discharge Perry. If anything, it demonstrates that Terry wanted 
him back at work. As a result, Perry has failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact with 
regard to the second element of his wrongful discharge claim.
Perry is also unable to demonstrate the fourth element of hisprimafacie case. Even if 
the court assumes arguendo that Perry was fired, there is no evidence that LEA terminated him 
because he had MS. In fact, Perry testified that the Outside Directors knew of his MS for several 
years and that he had missed a month and a half of work in the past because of MS (M. Perry 
Dep., DE # 99-2, at 156:6-157:6), yet he has not alleged that LEA took any adverse action 
against him prior to September 2009. Thus, he has failed to show that his separation from 
employment occurred under circumstances that raise a reasonable inference of unlawful 
discrimination. Cf. Brewington v. Getrag Corp., Civ. No. 5:09CV31-V, 2011 WL 4829399, at 16
16 Perry emphasizes that Becker did not actually start working for LEA until 1 September 2009, subsequent 
to Feldman’s termination. (Pls.’ Statement Material Facts, DE # 99-1, at 50 § IV.E. ^ 1; P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, 
at 299:2-10.) Even so, this does not change the fact that he was hired by Feldman.
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*6 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 12, 2011) (on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, an inference of 
discrimination could not be established where employer knew of plaintiff’s disability for 
approximately three years before taking adverse action).
Moreover, even if Perry could establish aprimafacie case of discrimination within the 
McDonnell Douglas framework, LEA has produced evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for its actions. At the time of Perry’s separation from employment on 23 September 
2009, LEA had a published policy which stated that “[e]mployees who fail to report to work or 
contact their supervisor for two (2) consecutive work days shall be considered to have 
abandoned the job without notice, effective at the end of their normal shift on the second day.” 
(M. Perry Dep., Ex. 19, DE # 92-3, at 147.) Perry’s employment with LEA ended after he failed 
to make contact with the company for more than two days following the expiration of his alleged 
ten-day medical leave, in violation of LEA’s neutral attendance policy. This is a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for LEA’s actions. See Ryan v. Columbus Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 
No. 7:10-CV-234-BR, 2012 WL 1230234, at *6 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 12, 2012) (employer produced a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason when it explained that plaintiff was terminated consistent 
with a neutral company policy). Finally, Perry has failed to raise a genuine dispute of material 
fact concerning pretext. He has failed to show that his employer did not honestly believe that he 
had abandoned his job, and there is simply no evidence in the record from which a rational fact 
finder could conclude that LEA’s actions in separating Perry from his employment were a 
pretext designed to mask disability discrimination.17 17
17 This conclusion is underscored by Perry’s deposition testimony. When asked what proof he had to show 
that his separation from employment was related to his disability, he answered: “ [W]ell, I was out with that disability 
when they fired me.” (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 208:25-209:1.) Such a meager response, by itself, is simply
(continued...)
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b. Failure to Accommodate Claims
In a failure to accommodate case under the ADA, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie 
case by showing (1) that he was an individual who had a disability within the meaning of the 
statute; (2) that the employer had notice of his disability; (3) that with reasonable 
accommodation he could perform the essential functions of the position; and (4) that the 
employer refused to make such accommodations. Crabill v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. of 
Educ., 423 F. App’x 314, 322 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Rhoads, 257 F.3d at 387 n.11); Haneke v. 
Mid-Atl. Capital Memt.. 131 F. App’x 399, 400 (4th Cir. 2005).
(1) Feldman
A failure to accommodate claim requires a showing that the plaintiff is disabled within 
the meaning of the ADA. As the court has discussed previously with respect to his wrongful 
discharge claim, Feldman has failed to present evidence of a disability. See discussion, supra, at 
14-18.
Furthermore, Feldman cannot meet the second element of his prima facie case, as there is 
no evidence in the record to show that LEA had notice of his alleged disability. See discussion, 
supra, at 18-20. With respect to this issue, the court emphasizes that although Jorgensen 
appeared at the 27 August 2009 Board meeting that resulted in Feldman’s termination, he simply 
“asked that the meeting be postponed.” (A. Rand Suppl. Aff., DE # 92-19, ^ 5.) There is no 
evidence to show that Jorgensen told the Outside Directors at that meeting that Feldman had 
been hospitalized or that he was suffering from a TIA. There is also no evidence to show that 17
17(...continued) 
insufficient to establish pretext.
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Jorgensen specifically asked for an accommodation for Feldman for a reason related to a medical
condition. See EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1049 (10th Cir. 2011) (In order to 
trigger an employer’s duty to accommodate a qualifying disability under the ADA, “the 
employee must make an adequate request, thereby putting the employer on notice.”); Bourne v. 
Exempla, Inc., Civ. A. No. 12-cv-01477-PAB-BNB, 2013 WL 1232139, at *5 (D. Colo. Mar. 27, 
2013) (“When an individual decides to request accommodation, the individual . . . must let the 
employer know that s/he needs an adjustment or change at work for a reason related to a medical 
condition.” (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Woods v. 
Donahoe, Civ. A. No. 5:11-cv-00043, 2012 WL 2994445, at *7 (S.D. W. Va. July 20, 2012) 
(where plaintiff did not specifically ask for an accommodation, defendant’s obligation to 
participate in the interactive process of determining a reasonable accommodation was not 
triggered). As a result, LEA is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
(2) Perry
LEA argues that Perry cannot establish the fourth element of his ADA accommodation 
claim. “Implicit in that fourth element, is the requirement that the employee has, in good faith, 
engaged in an interactive process to identify, in cooperation with the employer, what would 
constitute a reasonable accommodation.” May v. Roadway Express, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 623, 
627 (D. Md. 2002). As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has emphasized with respect to the 
ADA interactive process:
neither party should be able to cause a breakdown in the process for the purpose 
of either avoiding or inflicting liability. Rather, courts should look for signs of 
failure to participate in good faith or failure by one of the parties to make 
reasonable efforts to help the other party determine what specific 
accommodations are necessary. A party that obstructs or delays the interactive 
process is not acting in good faith. A party that fails to communicate, by way of
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initiation or response, may also be acting in bad faith. In essence, courts should 
attempt to isolate the cause of the breakdown and assign responsibility.
Crabill, 423 F. App’x at 323 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). “[A]n employer cannot be
found to have violated the ADA when responsibility for the breakdown of the ‘informal
interactive process’ is traceable to the employee and not the employer.” May, 221 F. Supp. 2d at
628 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
As discussed with respect to his wrongful discharge claim, it is undisputed that Perry
received the 14 September 2009 letter from Terry, which demanded a response from him. See
discussion, supra, at 24-25. It is also undisputed that Perry failed to respond to that letter. Id.
As with his wrongful discharge claim, Perry argues that he did not respond to the letter because
he was limited in his ability to communicate and because his doctor instructed him not to
communicate directly with LEA. However, as the court has already determined, Perry’s wife
had a history of communicating with LEA, and she could have responded to the letter on his
behalf. Id. at 25-26. As a result, the court finds that the breakdown of the interactive process in
this case is attributable to Perry. His undisputed and complete failure to respond to the 14
September 2009 letter is fatal to his failure to accommodate claim.18
Moreover, it is not clear in what manner LEA failed to accommodate Perry. LEA’s
general awareness of Perry’s disability does not trigger the duty to accommodate. See Boyer v.
Fette Elec. Servs., LLC, Civ. A. No. 4:10-cv-0704-JMC-TER, 2012 WL 684574, at *5 (D.S.C.
18Perry stresses that no one from LEA ever came by his house to see how he was doing, presumably in an 
attempt to show that LEA did not engage in the interactive process. (See, e.g., Pls.’ Statement Material Facts, DE # 
99-1, at 48 § IV.D. H 13; M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 99:25-100:3; P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, at 294:7-295:18; M. 
Finkelstein Dep., DE # 99-9, at 170:11-13.) Nevertheless, the record is clear that LEA’s representatives, including 
Terry and LEA attorney Mark Finkelstein, made efforts to communicate with Perry directly and with his personal 
attorney, Jorgensen, to obtain information regarding Perry’s condition while he was absent from work. (M. Perry 
Dep., DE # 99-2, at 95:1-18 & Exs. 6, 8-9, 11-13, DE # 92-3, at 123, 126-27, 129-31; A. Terry Aff., DE # 102-7, H 
8.) Thus, Perry has not demonstrated that LEA failed to engage in the interactive process.
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Jan. 23, 2012) (report and recommendation), adopted, 2012 WL 684456 (D.S.C. Mar. 1, 2012).
Rather, “it is the responsibility of the individual with a disability to inform the employer that an 
accommodation is needed.” 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App’x § 1630.9. In this case, Perry’s wife 
specifically told Briggs on 4 September 2009 that Perry would be out for “10 days” or “two 
weeks.” (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 205:22-206:2; 207:14-18; Defs.’ Reply Supp. Mot. 
Summ. J., Ex. 1, DE # 102-1, at 5.) The accommodation requested by Perry’s wife was in fact 
provided by LEA, and Perry requested no other accommodation prior to his separation from 
employment.19 (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 208:3-12.) Therefore, summary judgment on 
Perry’s failure to accommodate claim is appropriate.
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act Claims
Next, plaintiffs allege that all of the defendants violated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
18 U.S.C. § 1514A (“SOX”). The court initially considers plaintiffs’ claims against LEA. SOX 
“creates ‘whistleblower’ protection for employees of publicly-traded companies by prohibiting 
employers from retaliating against employees because they provided information about 
potentially unlawful conduct.” Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269, 275 (4th Cir. 2008). The statute 
specifically provides:
No [publicly-traded company], or any officer [or] employee . . . of such company 
. . . , may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner 
discriminate against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment 
because of any lawful act done by the employee--
(1) to provide information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist
19 As previously discussed, Dr. Freedman’s second note regarding an additional period of medical leave 
was not offered or provided to LEA until after LEA had deemed Perry to have voluntarily quit his job on 23 
September 2009. (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 205:18-206:8 & Ex. 15, DE # 92-3, at 133; Defs.’ Reply Supp. Mot. 
Summ. J., Ex. C, DE # 102-3.) See discussion, supra, at 27. Thus, Perry’s argument that this note served as a basis 
for a request for an accommodation is without merit.
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in an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably 
believes constitutes a violation of section 1341 [mail fraud], 1343 [wire fraud],
1344 [bank fraud], or 1348 [securities fraud], any rule or regulation of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to 
fraud against shareholders, when the information or assistance is provided to or 
the investigation is conducted by--
(A) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency;
(B) any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress; or
(C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such other person 
working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or 
terminate misconduct) . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a).
In order to establish aprimafacie showing of a SOX violation, an employee bears the 
initial burden of demonstrating that: (1) the employee engaged in activity protected by SOX; (2) 
the employer knew, actually or constructively, of the protected activity; (3) the employee 
suffered an unfavorable personnel action; and (4) the protected activity was a contributing factor 
in the personnel action. See, e.g., Bechtel v. Admin. Review Bd., 710 F.3d 443, 447 (2d Cir. 
2013); Welch, 536 F.3d at 275; Livingston v. Wyeth, Inc., 520 F.3d 344, 351-52 (4th Cir. 2008); 
Miller v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d 975, 982 (D. Minn. 2011). When a 
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation under SOX, the burden then shifts 
to the defendant to demonstrate “by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the 
same adverse employment action in the absence of the plaintiff’s protected activity.” Welch,
536 F.3d at 275; see also Livingston, 520 F.3d at 352-53; 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b); 49 U.S.C. § 
42121(b)(2)(B).
The court initially finds that Perry’s SOX claim against LEA must fail because he cannot 
establish the third element of his claim, i.e., that he suffered an unfavorable employment action.
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As the court has previously discussed, Perry was not discharged. Rather, he was separated from
his employment because he abandoned his position. See discussion, supra, at 23-29. 
Nevertheless, even if Perry had met his burden of demonstrating this element, his SOX claim 
would still not succeed because he has failed to establish other elements of hisprimafacie case 
as discussed below.
To establish the first element of their prima facie case, plaintiffs must show that they 
complained to a “Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency . . . or a person with supervisory 
authority” over them, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(A), (C), and that their complaint “definitively 
and specifically”20 related to: (1) mail fraud, (2) wire fraud, (3) bank fraud, (4) securities fraud, 
(5) any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission or (6) any provision of 
federal law relating to fraud against shareholders. Welch, 536 F.3d at 275 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Platone v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 548 F.3d 322, 326-27 (4th 
Cir. 2008). In addition, plaintiffs must show that they had both “‘a subjective belief and an 
objectively reasonable belief” that the conduct they complained of constituted a violation of 
relevant law. Welch, 536 F.3d at 275 (quoting Livingston, 520 F.3d at 352).
Here, plaintiffs allege that they engaged in protected activities when they reported to 
LEA’s Board, and to the federal government, that Carrington had involved LEA in possible
20Although the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressly adopted the “definitively and specifically” 
standard, a recent decision by the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) of the Department of Labor, the agency 
charged with enforcing the SOX whistleblower protections, see 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b), indicates that this standard 
“has evolved into an inappropriate test and is often applied too strictly.” Sylvester v. Parexel Int’l LLC, ARB Case 
No. 07-123, ALJ Case Nos. 2007-SOX-039, 2007-SOX-042, 2011 WL 2165854, at *15 (U.S. Dep’t of Labor May 
25, 2011). Instead, the ARB explains that “the critical focus is on whether the employee reported conduct that he or 
she reasonably believes constituted a violation of federal law.” Id. (emphasis in original). Decisions of the ARB are 
entitled to Chevron deference by this court. See Welch, 536 F.3d at 275-76 & n.2. In this case, however, the court 
assumes without deciding that plaintiffs’ activities meet the higher definite and specific standard. See discussion. 
infra, at 37. As a result, the court need not now resolve the issue of whether the recent decision by the ARB affects 
Fourth Circuit precedent.
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felonies relating to SAFE Source’s export business; when they objected to falsified Board 
meeting minutes regarding those reports and other LEA matters; when they objected to leaks 
from the Outside Directors to Carrington regarding their reports of SAFE Source’s activities; 
when they objected to, and refused to pay, what they considered to be fraudulent invoices for 
legal services submitted by attorney Mark Finkelstein (“Finkelstein”); and when they reported 
suspected insider trading to a federal agent prior to their being separated from their employment. 
(Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Mot. Summ. J., DE # 99, at 1, 28-29.) With respect to the first element of 
plaintiffs’ prima facie case, it is unclear whether all of the alleged protected activities are 
protected by SOX. Nevertheless, the court assumes without deciding that all of these activities 
meet the definite and specific standard and that they fall within one or more of the six 
enumerated categories listed in Section 1514A of SOX.
The court initially considers plaintiffs’ report of suspected insider trading. In July or 
August 2009, plaintiffs contacted Phil Kuhn (“Kuhn”), an agent with the Bureau of Industry and 
Security, which is a division of the Department of Commerce. (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 
222:3-225:6; 270:10-280:11; P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 218:1-222:21.) Plaintiffs informed 
Kuhn of the existence of a Non-Objecting Beneficial Owner (“NOBO”) list which was dated 7 
October 2004. (Id.) The NOBO list showed who owned LEA stock at that time. (Id.)
Plaintiffs’ review of the list led them to conclude that insider trading of LEA stock had taken 
place because some of the shareholders on the list were prominent North Carolina politicians. 
(Id.; P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, at 319:8-321:21; 325:21-327:10; 330:22-331:13.)
With respect to the first prima facie element, the court finds that plaintiffs have failed to 
raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether they had both a subjective belief and an
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objectively reasonable belief that their report of possible insider trading was a violation of
relevant law. See Welch, 536 F.3d at 275. This element requires an employee to show “both 
that he actually believed the conduct complained of constituted a violation of pertinent law and 
that a reasonable person in his position would have believed that the conduct constituted a 
violation.” Id. at 277-78 n.4 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, plaintiffs did not have an objectively reasonable belief that a violation had 
occurred because they had very little information on which to make the insider trading 
allegation. The NOBO list was merely a snapshot in time of who owned shares in LEA. It said 
nothing about why the owners bought shares, the price they paid, how long they had held the 
shares, or whether they intended to sell the shares. (P. Briggs Aff., DE # 92-7, ^ 14; M. Perry 
Dep., DE # 99-2, at 279:5-280:8; P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, at 325:21-326:9; 330:14-16.) 
Although plaintiffs’ evidence of insider trading was extremely thin, they did not try to obtain any 
additional information before making their report to Kuhn. Because of this paucity of 
information, plaintiffs lacked an objectively reasonable basis on which to base their report.
Furthermore, plaintiffs cannot establish the second element of theirprimafacie case with 
respect to this particular activity because they have not shown that LEA knew about their report 
of suspected insider trading. Although plaintiffs contend that Briggs participated in the call to 
Kuhn (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 276:10-279:4; P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 219:21­
220:3), it is undisputed that Briggs was a subordinate of Feldman.21 (P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-
21Feldman hired Briggs to be LEA’s Controller effective 28 January 2008. In or around May 2008, Briggs 
became LEA’s Chief Financial Officer. (P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, at 18:6-12; P. Briggs Suppl. Aff., DE # 102-4,  ^
4.) Briggs reported to Feldman. (P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 42:17-19.) Briggs became President of LEA and 
also became a member of the Board in December 2009, which was after plaintiffs had been separated from their 
employment. (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 153:2-25; P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, at 19:1-15.)
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4, at 42:17-19; P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, at 18:6-21:9.) Because Briggs did not have 
supervisory authority over plaintiffs, see 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C), his knowledge of the 
report of insider trading is insufficient to demonstrate LEA’s knowledge of the report.
Plaintiffs also admit that they did not tell the Outside Directors about the call they made 
to Kuhn regarding the NOBO list. (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 225:15-226:1; 280:12-15; P. 
Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 165:19-23.) Nevertheless, they maintain that the Outside Directors 
were made aware of the report through Briggs. (See Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Mot. Summ. J., DE # 99, 
at 29; Pls.’ Statement Material Facts, DE # 99-1, at 14 § I.G.) However, this is pure speculation 
on the part of plaintiffs. They have failed to present any credible evidence in support of their 
contention that Briggs told the Outside Directors about the call with Kuhn.22 Moreover, in their 
memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, they concede that “the Outside 
Directors’ knowledge [of the report made to Kuhn] is not certain . . . . ” (Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Mot. 
Summ. J., DE # 99, at 29.) The undisputed evidence is that Briggs has denied telling anyone else 
at LEA about the 2004 NOBO list. (P. Briggs Aff., DE # 92-7, ^ 15.) It is axiomatic that LEA 
could not retaliate for alleged whistleblower conduct of which it was unaware. Thus, plaintiffs 
have failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to LEA’s actual or constructive 
knowledge of their report of possible insider trading. For the foregoing reasons, their SOX 
claims regarding this report are not viable.
All of plaintiffs’ other alleged protected activities occurred between late December 2007
22For example, when Feldman was asked to explain why he thought that Briggs reported the call to the 
Outside Directors, his response was: “I think . . . a lot of things. . . . I just go back to the old adage; if it walks like a 
duck, quacks like a duck, it’s a duck.” (P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 223:3, 14-16.)
39
and early May 2008.23 Plaintiffs contend that they told the Outside Directors about the issues 
caused by Carrington’s ownership of SAFE Source, including LEA’s potential liability, during 
the Board meeting that occurred on 27 December 2007. (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 324:3­
325:20; P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 188:13-189:19; 190:12-191:12.) Rand allegedly leaked 
information to Carrington regarding the issues raised in the 27 December 2007 Board meeting 
shortly after the meeting took place. (M. Perry Dep. DE # 99-2, at 258:19-262:17; P. Feldman 
Dep., DE # 99-4, at 191:13-193:6; E. Littman Dep., DE # 99-15, at 86:14-87:6.)
In addition, on 14 January 2008, plaintiffs sent a letter to Kuhn regarding Carrington’s 
ownership of SAFE Source and the illegal export business that SAFE Source conducted with 
LEA, and they met with Kuhn within two weeks of the date that the letter was sent. (M. Perry 
Dep., DE # 99-2, at 227:22-230:2; 244:15-245:13; 264:13-265:1; P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 
166:7-167:15; Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 44, DE # 99-45.) Feldman further reported 
to Kuhn that Rand was revealing the proceedings of LEA Board meetings to Carrington and that 
Rand knew that competing versions of Board meeting minutes had been drafted without a 
finalized version ever being adopted. (Pls.’ Statement Material Facts, DE # 99-1, at 14 § I.F. ^ 4; 
M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 249:16-250:6 & Ex. 38, DE # 92-3, at 221-229; P. Feldman Dep., 
DE # 99-4, at 249:22-251:2; Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 28, DE # 99-29; id., Ex. 46, 
DE # 99-47.) Finally, plaintiffs disagreed with and contested the contents of invoices for legal 
services that Finkelstein submitted to LEA from late 2007 through 1 May 2008. (Pls.’ Statement 
Material Facts, DE # 99-1, at 16-17 § I.H. ^  2, 4; M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 218:7-221:4; P. 23
23 Although the exact dates of several of plaintiffs’ complaints are not manifestly clear from the record (see, 
e.g., M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 218:7-221:4; P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 174:18-20; 249:22-251:2; J. Jordan 
Dep., DE # 99-17, at 90:19-91:19), it is reasonable to infer that the complaints were made soon after the 
objectionable conduct occurred.
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Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 170:7-175:8; J. Jordan Dep., DE # 99-17, at 90:19-91:19; Pls.’ 
Mem. Opp’n Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 15, DE # 99-16.) The court finds that plaintiffs have presented 
sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute of material fact regarding LEA’s awareness of 
these activities.24 (See, e.g., Pls.’ Statement Material Facts, DE # 99-1, at 16-21 §§ I.H., II.)
With regard to these remaining SOX activities, plaintiffs must demonstrate that their 
whistleblowing was a contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel actions that were taken 
against them.25 “A ‘contributing factor’ is any factor, which alone or in combination with other 
factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome of the decision.” Allen v. Admin. Review Bd., 
514 F.3d 468, 476 n.3 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); cf Marano 
v. Dep’t of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Whistleblower Protection Act case). 
“Temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action is a significant factor 
in considering a circumstantial showing of causation.” Fraser v. Fiduciary Trust Co. Int’l, No.
04 Civ. 6958(PAC), 2009 WL 2601389, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2009) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted), aff’d 396 F. App’x 734 (2d Cir. 2010) (unpublished); see also Van 
Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 1003 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[C]ausation can be inferred 
from timing alone where an adverse employment action follows on the heels of protected
24 The court also notes that plaintiffs conclusorily state that they “continued their protected activity through 
the times of their firings . . . .” (Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Mot. Summ. J., DE # 99, at 28; see also Pls.’ Statement Material 
Facts, DE # 99-1, at 3 § I. (“Feldman and Perry engaged in protected activity under SOX by . . . continuing to 
cooperate in a federal investigation.”).) However, they have pointed to no evidence to support this contention, and 
the court is not obligated to scour the record in search of a dispute of material fact. Furthermore, even if plaintiffs 
did engage in additional protected activities, they have not cited to any record evidence to show that LEA was aware 
of such activities. The only evidence that plaintiffs have set forth regarding LEA’s knowledge of their protected 
activities relates to events that occurred between 27 December 2007 and 1 May 2008. (See, e.g., Pls.’ Statement 
Material Facts, DE # 99-1, at 16-21 §§ I.H., II.)
25The court assumes arguendo for the purposes of this discussion that Perry suffered an adverse 
employment action.
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activity.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
LEA argues that the temporal gap between plaintiffs’ last complaint and their separation 
from employment is not sufficiently proximate to demonstrate that the protected activity was a 
contributing factor in the adverse personnel actions. In this case, the last protected activity that 
LEA had knowledge of allegedly occurred following the 1 May 2008 submission of Finkelstein’s 
invoice for legal services rendered. (Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 15, DE # 99-16.) 
However, Feldman was not terminated until 27 August 2009, and Perry was not separated from 
his employment until 23 September 2009. Here, the gap of approximately sixteen to seventeen 
months between the protected activity and the unfavorable employment actions is simply too 
attenuated to establish the causation necessary to sustain their SOX claims. See, e.g., Miller, 812 
F. Supp. 2d at 988 (eight-month gap between plaintiff’s last complaint and her discharge was not 
sufficiently proximate to demonstrate that the protected activity was a contributing factor to her 
termination); Fraser, 2009 WL 2601389, at *6 (ten-month gap in time defeated SOX claim); 
Pardy v. Gray, No. 07 Civ. 6324(LAP), 2008 WL 2756331, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2008) 
(six-month gap in time defeated SOX claim).
In response, plaintiffs argue that they are not relying on “mere temporal proximity” but 
are also relying on “evidence of recurring retaliatory animus” to show that their protected 
activity was a contributing factor to their separation from employment. (Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Mot. 
Summ. J., DE # 99, at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted).) It is true that where an employee 
provides other evidence indicating a connection between his protected activity and the adverse 
personnel action, some courts allow for a more relaxed temporal proximity in SOX cases. See, 
e.g., Leshinsky v. Telvent GIT, S.A., — F. Supp. 2d —, No. 10 Civ. 4511(JPO), 2013 WL
42
1811877, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2013); Barker v. UBS AG, 888 F. Supp. 2d 291, 300-01 (D.
Conn. 2012).
In determining whether plaintiffs have demonstrated the existence of a recurring 
retaliatory animus, the court notes that plaintiffs and defendants agree that “[a] split existed 
between the Outside and Inside Directors . . . .” (Pls.’ Statement Material Facts, DE # 99-1, at 2 
^ B; see also Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., DE # 92-1, at 2.) While the exact cause of the 
split is hotly disputed, it is clear that it was related to the announcement of Carrington’s sale of 
LEA stock to Raymond James. (See, e.g., P. Briggs Aff., DE # 92-7, ^ 3; P. Briggs Aff., DE # 
92-13, 14-15; S. Carrington Aff., DE # 92-14, ^ 3; Pls.’ Statement Material Facts, DE # 99-1,
at 22-25 § III.A.; P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 180:6-181:25; P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, at 
265:14-266:1; M. White Dep., DE # 99-6, at 43:20-44:21; E. Littman Dep., DE # 99-15, at 38:7­
39:12; 53:4-54:18; 71:19-74:4; 156:21-157:15.) Plaintiffs first learned about the sale sometime 
in August or September 2007. (P. Briggs Aff., DE # 92-13, ^ 14; P. Feldman Dep., DE # 99-4, at 
181:5-182-19; Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 45, DE # 99-46.)
Importantly, plaintiffs admit that this split between the Inside Directors and the Outside 
Directors “was already in existence at least as of November 1, 2007.”26 (Pls.’ Statement Material 
Facts, DE # 99-1, at 2 ^ B.) Thus, the animus between plaintiffs and the Outside Directors 
developed before plaintiffs’ first protected activity occurred on 27 December 2007. This refutes
26 The court notes that 1 November 2007 was a particularly significant date with regard to the exacerbation 
of the rift between the Inside and Outside Directors that began when Carrington announced the sale of LEA stock. 
At a Board meeting on that date, by a vote of three to two, the Outside Directors withdrew the Board’s prior vote to 
approve employment contracts for Perry and Feldman. (M. Perry Dep., Ex. 38, DE # 92-3, at 223-24.) This was 
also the first Board meeting attended by Finkelstein, who just “showed up” with Rand. (E. Littman Dep., DE # 99­
15, at 26:8.) Plaintiffs initially tried to exclude Finkelstein from participating, but they ultimately allowed him to 
remain, and the meeting went forward. (Id. at 26:3-27:2; M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 234:22-235:8; A. Rand Dep., 
DE # 99-3, at 154:9-156:12.)
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plaintiffs’ contention that LEA had a retaliatory motive in taking adverse action against them.
See Sussberg v. K-Mart Holding Corp., 463 F. Supp. 2d 704, 713-14 (E.D. Mich. 2006) 
(defendant’s motion for summary judgment granted where there was a five-month gap between 
protected activity and termination and where there was evidence of ongoing performance 
problems prior to the protected activity); Bechtel v. Competitive Techs., Inc., ARB Case No. 09­
052, ALJ Case No. 09-052, 2011 WL 4889269, at *10 (U.S. Dep’t Labor Sept. 30, 2011) 
(protected activity not a contributing factor where complainant admitted that his relationship 
with employer had rocky moments as early as August 2002, which was well before his first 
protected activity occurred in December of that year).
Moreover, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they were actually retaliated against 
in any way prior to their separation from employment. Although it is evident that palpable 
tension and disagreements existed between plaintiffs and the Outside Directors, plaintiffs did not 
experience a demotion, a decrease in salary, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished 
material responsibilities, disciplinary action, harassment, or other indices unique to their 
situation following their protected activities. Cf Bechtel, 2011 WL 4889269, at *10 
(complainant “failed to establish that any of his protected activity, intermixed as it was with his 
ongoing disagreements and heated discussions with [the company’s CEO] over business 
decisions, contributed to his discharge.”).
The lack of causal connection between plaintiffs’ complaints and their separation from 
employment is further bolstered by the intervening events of 2009. See Sussberg, 463 F. Supp. 
2d at 713 (“a ‘legitimate intervening event’ may defeat any causal inference that might be 
premised upon temporal proximity” (citation omitted)). Here, the factual record indicates that
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the legitimate intervening basis for Feldman’s termination in August 2009 was the determination 
that he was insubordinate when he made comments to the Wortleys about the Outside 
Directors’s lack of involvement in LEA’s operations and then emailed the Outside Directors and 
urged them to resign from the Board. (See, e.g., E. Littman Dep., Ex. 26, DE # 92-12, at 253:25­
254:20; 256:21-258:10; A. Rand Aff., DE # 92-15, U 11; J. Jordan Aff., DE # 92-16, U 5; J. 
Lindsay Aff., DE # 92-17, UU 7-8; A. Rand Dep., DE # 99-3, at 262:12-21 & Ex. 33, DE # 92-10, 
at 70; P. Briggs Dep., DE # 99-5, at 155:14-157:19; J. Lindsay Dep., DE # 99-7, at 66:13-20; J. 
Jordan Dep., DE # 99-17, at 35:14-36:19; 53:15-54:11.) Similarly, the factual record indicates 
that the legitimate intervening basis for Perry’s separation from employment was his failure in 
September 2009 to respond to LEA’s request for information regarding his intention to return to 
work. (M. Perry Dep., DE # 99-2, at 90:19-91:2 & Ex. 14, DE # 92-3, at 132; A. Terry Aff., DE 
# 102-7, UU 6, 8.) See Miller, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 989 (plaintiff failed to establish causation 
between protected activity and termination where there was a legitimate intervening basis for the 
adverse action); Fraser, 2009 WL 2601389, at *6 (same).
In sum, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate causation based on a combination of factors: 
the utter lack of temporal proximity between the protected activities and plaintiffs’ separation 
from employment; the rocky relationship that existed between plaintiffs and the Outside 
Directors prior to the start of any protected activity; and the intervening events of 2009. 
Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, no reasonable jury could find 
that their alleged protected activities were a contributing factor in LEA’s decision to separate 
them from their employment.
Because plaintiffs have failed to establish aprima facie causal connection, the court need
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not examine whether LEA can show by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken 
the same actions against plaintiffs even if it did not know of their complaints. Nonetheless, the 
court notes that, for many of the same reasons discussed above, LEA has demonstrated that it 
had a legitimate business reason for its actions, and the court in a SOX case cannot sit as a 
“super personnel department” to “second guess an employer’s facially legitimate business 
decisions.” Riddle v. First Tenn. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 497 F. App’x 588, 596 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(unpublished) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Finally, there can be no SOX liability against Rand, Lindsay, Jordan, or Briggs. The 
claims against them fail just as they have failed with respect to LEA. Plaintiffs have not made a 
specific argument in their memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment with 
respect to these individuals. As a result, the individual defendants are entitled to summary 
judgment with respect to plaintiffs’ SOX claims.
C. LEA’s Counterclaim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Remaining before the court is LEA’s counterclaim against plaintiffs for breach of 
fiduciary duty. (Defs.’ Answer, DE # 36, at 44-57.) Neither plaintiffs nor defendants have made 
a motion with respect to this counterclaim. The cause of action described in the counterclaim is 
founded in state law and lacks any independent jurisdictional basis. The governing statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), permits a district court, in its discretion, to decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over state law claims if it has dismissed all federal claims. Furthermore, in 
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988), the United States Supreme 
Court stated that when all federal claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors 
generally favors declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction over remaining state law claims and
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dismissing them without prejudice. See also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715, 726 (1966) (“It has consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of 
discretion, not of . . . right. . . . [I]f the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not 
insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.”). Having 
now resolved all of the claims asserted in plaintiffs’ amended complaint, the court declines to 
retain and exercise supplemental jurisdiction over LEA’s counterclaim and will dismiss that 
claim without prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a separate statement of material facts in conjunction 
with their opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment (DE # 97) is GRANTED. 
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (DE # 92) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ motion to 
continue the trial (DE # 95) is DENIED AS MOOT. LEA’s counterclaim against plaintiffs is 
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of 
defendants and close the case.
This 27 June 2013.
W. Earl Britt
Senior U.S. District Judge
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